نشرت صحيفة الأخبار اللبنانية صباح اليوم الجمعة النص الإنجليزي الكامل للمراسلات الدبلوماسية بين السفارة الأمريكية في نواكشوط ووزارة الخارجية الأمريكية خلال السنتين الماضيتين وتضم المراسلات كما كبيرا من المعلومات المتعلقة بالمرحلة التي تلت الانقلاب العسكري في السادس من أغسطس 2008، وقضية قطع العلاقات مع " إسرائيل" والإضطرابات التى عرفتها البلاد مطلع العام الماضي حول قضية التعريب.

وسيقوم موقع السراج الإخباري خلال الساعات القادمة بترجمة أهم المعطيات الواردة في هذه الوثائق التى ننشر فيما يلي نصها الكامل بالانجليزية كما نشرها موقع ويكيليكس.

08NOUAKCHOTT439 Date17/08/2008 04:41 OriginEmbassy Nouakchott ClassificationCONFIDENTIAL Header

Excerpt from document summary

(C) General Aziz, accompanied by his Director of Cabinet,

Cheyakh Ould Ely, and Presidential Diplomatic and Security

Advisor, Ould Michel, received visiting AF DAS Todd Moss and

DoD Principal Director for African Affairs, Michael Dumont as

well as Ambassador and DATT. DAS Moss underscored that the

objectives of his visit were to insure that the junta

understood the USG's position, that it was a whole of

government position, and to explore possibilities for the

resolution of the crisis.

Full Document

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Content

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 NOUAKCHOTT 000439

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/17/2018

TAGS: PREL, MR

SUBJECT: SITREP 10 - VISIT OF U.S. ENVOYS TO MAURITANIA

Classified By: Ambassador Mark M. Boulware

--------------------------------------------- ---------------

DAS MOSS MEETING WITH GENERAL AZIZ

--------------------------------------------- ---------------

1. (C) General Aziz, accompanied by his Director of Cabinet,

Cheyakh Ould Ely, and Presidential Diplomatic and Security

Advisor, Ould Michel, received visiting AF DAS Todd Moss and

DoD Principal Director for African Affairs, Michael Dumont as

well as Ambassador and DATT. DAS Moss underscored that the

objectives of his visit were to insure that the junta

understood the USG's position, that it was a whole of

government position, and to explore possibilities for the

resolution of the crisis. Moss noted that the US and the

broader international community's considered Mauritanian

democracy not only intrinsically positive but also as an

important example for the rest of Africa and the Arab world.

He said that assessment resulted not only in broad goodwill

but into the significant financial support pledged at the

Paris Consultative Group meeting last December. Observing

that while USG assistance was relatively modest, several

initiatives were underway that would likely have led to

several hundreds of millions of dollars of military and

development assistance.

2. (C) DAS Moss reiterated that the USG could not accept a

military coup both for reasons of principle and US law. He

noted that 2008 was nothing like 2005, that Africa was moving

on and the era of coups was over. Underscoring the urgent

need to find a solution, he said that little time remained

before the current suspension of assistance became formal and

final. He assured General Aziz that the USG did not want to

see Mauritania isolated from the international community and

did not want to see a window of opportunity opened for Al

Qaeda. He expressed his hope that we could explore some next

steps that would necessarily include the liberation and

restoration of President Abdallahi and an honorable

arrangement for the Mauritanian military. He stressed the

USG's comprehension of the importance of the military as an

institution and as a partner. Moss lamented the fact that

our strong military cooperation was now in jeopardy and would

necessarily be curtailed if constitutional order was not

quickly restored.

3. (C) Expressing thanks for the USG's interest, Aziz

insisted that what happened in Mauritania was not a coup. He

accused President Abdallahi variously of corruption (citing

specifically Transparency International's ranking),

incompetence, authoritarianism, loss of political support,

including Islamists and communists in government,

indifference to national security, and creating government

paralysis and political deadlock. He condemned both the form

and substance of President Abdallahi's decree dismissing the

military leadership calling it an illegal order that

threatened to spark violence. He said that four-fifths of

parliamentarians wanted to bring Abdallahi to trial and that

the "reality of Mauritania" was that Abdallahi was flatly

rejected by the people. Aziz said that our military

relationship was important and that it was he, not Abdallahi,

who had strengthened it. As only the "executive" was touched

by this move, the military relationship could continue.

4. (C) DAS Moss observed that democracy was a messy process,

not always highly efficient and that even established

democracies faced similar challenges. He said that what

mistakes President Abdallahi and his administration might

have made, this removal and arrest were even bigger mistakes

and the international coup not help but consider this a coup.

He stated that our bilateral relations had been strong not

because of President Abdallahi personally but because

Mauritania was a democracy and they could not remain the same

under these circumstances. An immediate first step was to

restore democracy and that none of the alleged problems he

cited could justify the coup. He repeated that broad

international goodwill, international support, and the

military relationship with the US were now all very much at

NOUAKCHOTT 00000439 002 OF 006

risk.

5. (C) Reiterating the solidarity between the US, France, the

EU and the AU, Moss urged Aziz to "talk to us about a way out

of this crisis." He opined that there must be some way to

restore President Abdallahi and to address military concerns

and also to engage with a willing international community to

address Mauritania's many problems including corruption.

Moss said that a good place to start and a gesture of

seriousness would be to allow him to visit Abdallahi before

leaving Nouakchott and that he was would rearrange his

schedule to accomplish that, if permitted. Noting the

personal interest on the US side of the President, Secretary

Rice and Deputy Secretary Negroponte, such a gesture could be

"an important signal."

6. (C) Asked to contribute a Department of Defense

perspective, Principal Director Michael Dumont noted that,

speaking as a former military officer and a lawyer, anytime

an elected leader was removed and arrested by the military

that constituted a coup d'etat He noted that the coup

created a stain on the military's honor that the Department

of Defense could not overlook and that only General Aziz

could remove.

7. (C) Aziz reiterated his thanks for USG concern, indicated

that he "understood" our position and would seek to maintain

a dialogue. He regretted, however, that "internal security"

concerns precluded visiting President Abdallahi at this time.

8. (C) Comment: General Aziz, seen dressed for the first

time since the coup in a business suit, was visibly

uncomfortable and laid out his litany of accusations against

Abdallahi in a less orderly and polished manner than he had

when receiving previous demarches. Although he seemed to

hesitate somewhat when DAS Moss first raised the possibility

of visiting Abdallahi, in the end he refused, leaving us with

virtually no starting point for the dialogue he professes to

welcome.

--------------------------------------------- --------------

MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER WAGHEF

--------------------------------------------- --------------

9. (C) Deputy Assistant Secretary Todd Moss and DOD

Principal Director for Africa Michael Dumont, accompanied by

Ambassador, met August 15 with Prime Minister Yahya Ould el

Waghef, President of the National Assembly Boukheir and

President of the Economic and Social Council Ahmed Ould Sidi

Baba at the Prime Minister's private residence.

10. (C) The Prime Minister described a situation of

"impossible pressure" being exerted by the military junta on

the Mauritanian people and its political leaders. We noted

that both the Presidents of the National Assembly and Senate

were being threatened with investigations for alleged

mismanagement and corruption if they did not side with the

junta and added he himself had been threatened if he did not

join in the investiture of the "new" Prime Minister Laghdaf

and side with the junta -- which he has, of course, refused.

The Prime Minister noted that "only a few" can withstand the

pressure and added that the junta is controlling the media as

a 24 hour barrage of pro-coup propaganda. He opined that

average Mauritanians, after decades of succeeding coups, were

disheartened and tended to offer little resistance to the

coup since they saw such efforts as futile.

11. (C) Waghef saw the response to this coup as "the one

chance for Mauritania and Africa" to once and finally break

the practice of governmental change by force. He said that

if we yield to the coup again -- led by the same leaders of

the coup of 2005 " there would be no chance for real

democracy in Mauritania." He said "the coup MUST fail" for,

if it fails, no military leader with ever try again in

Mauritania -- perhaps not in the region. He cautioned not to

accept any discussion of "new elections" since that would

only legitimize the coup. Waghef called for rapid targeted

NOUAKCHOTT 00000439 003 OF 006

sanctions against the military putschists and their civilian

collaborators and for a firm position of the international

community to cease "all possible contact" with the junta. We

also called for the Security Council to take strong action

against to putsch. Waghef also urged that the international

response not be limited to freezing development assistance,

but stopping military cooperation as well indicating this was

a measure that would concern Aziz more. He suggested he was

particularly concerned about the French position on military

cooperation.

12. (C) President of the National Assembly Boukheir said the

military had taken power in a completely unconstitutional

manner and was attempting to manipulate the national assembly

to legitimize its actions. He argued that the transition

process for legislative elections had been manipulated by the

military just for this eventuality. Of the 95 seats in the

Assembly, 50 had been filled with "independents" financed by

the military. He dismissed arguments of a two-thirds

majority of the parliament being in favor of the coup saying

that any parliamentarian who willingly abandons his

commitment to the constitution loses their legitimacy and is

no better than the putchists. Boukheir said he had refused

to cooperate with the military in their efforts to manipulate

the parliament telling them, "if you're going to stage a

coup, you might as well dissolve parliament and the political

parties as well." Boukheir noted the first decree of the

High State of Council not only overturns the presidency, but

exerts the right to over-rule the parliament should their

efforts at parliamentary manipulation fail. He added that if

the coup succeeds, there can be no chance for democracy.

13. (C) Ahmed Ould Sidi Baba dismissed General Aziz as one

lacking "the education, intelligence or experience" to head

the military -- much less the country and asserted that the

idiocy of the current situation is that it stems from this

one individual to accept a legal order dismissing him. Sidi

Baba argued the past 16 months of democracy had seen a

flourishing of liberty and the beginning of international

investment interest ) all of which was at stake now because

Aziz was trying to make himself a "new Emperor Bokassa."

Sidi Baba asserted 80 to 85 percent of the population opposes

the coup though few have the courage to say so openly.

14. (C) Sidi Baba said the situation of the country was

extremely fragile and that, if the crisis was not resolved

within weeks, it would be the Mauritania people who would

suffer. He added that the only person who could negotiate a

resolution was Abdallahi himself since neither he, the Prime

Minister, nor the President's of the Senate and National

Assembly had the constitutional legitimacy to do so. Sidi

Baba called on the U.N. to try the putschists as they have

those guilty of genocide.

15. (C) Deputy Assistant Secretary Moss assured the

Mauritanians of a firm U.S. position based on:

(a) Complete repudiation of the coup,

(b) Demands for the immediate release and restoration of

President Abdallahi,

(c) A commitment in this visit to tell the junta this coup

will not stand,

(d) The rejection of the junta's calls for &new8 elections,

and,

(e) The continued suspension of assistance which, if the coup

is not reversed very rapidly, will become permanent with the

funds going elsewhere.

Moss said the U.S. would stick to this position as a matter

of principle, as a reflection of our hopes for Mauritania,

and as a matter of U.S. law. He said his goal was to

convince General Aziz that he could not recreate the coup of

2005. The time of coups in Africa is done as we are seeing

to the strong response of the U.S., France, the E.U., the

A.U. and even of Algeria and Saudi Arabia. Moss added that

any political negotiation must necessarily start with

President Abdallahi back in the Presidency (Moss repeatedly

NOUAKCHOTT 00000439 004 OF 006

returned to these points in subsequent meetings and during

his August 15 press conference). Ambassador highlighted that

the participation of the Defense Department's Mr. Dumont in

the delegation was to convince General Aziz that there would

be no "under-the-table" arrangement placing security

cooperation above our priority for the restoration of

democracy.

---------------------------------

Meeting with Ould Daddah

---------------------------------

16. (SBU) Deputy Assistant Secretary Moss, Principal Director

Dumont along with the Ambassador, DCM and PAO met with the

formal leader of the opposition (a ministerial-ranked

position in Mauritania) Ahmed Ould Daddah (RFD) along with

several other party members at RFD party headquarters in

Nouakchott.

17. (C) Daddah presented his party as the foundation of

resistance to the military since the creation of the movement

in October 1991. Daddah's father, Moktar Ould Daddah was

Mauritania's first head-of state ruling from November 1960 to

April 1979 -- spending his last two years, following a 1978

coup, as head of the "Military Committee for National

Recovery." Daddah reiterated his view of the evolution of

the conflict and stated both his political opposition to the

coup but also his opposition to reinstating President

Abdallahi. He recognized that the coup as the natural

teleological end to a government led by a president who had

lost his legitimacy for two principle reasons: 1) not having

been democratically elected (in that he was propped up by the

military which had rigged the voting) and 2) throughout his

presidency he failed to establish good governance that would

help him gain legitimacy. He indicated that he had put

conditions forward to the military for the next steps;

however, did not go into detail on what such criteria were.

He also frankly and forthrightly stated that from their

perspective, everything was negotiable except for the return

of President Abdallahi to power and offered himself as an

interlocutor in any future negotiations.

18. (C) Daddah, as is prone to do as an avid intellectual and

thinker, used esoteric quotes to illustrate his philosophy in

invoking Latin maxims and Voltaire. One of Pascal's Pensees

made while overlooking the Pyrenees mountains separating

Spain and France summed up his view of the coup and its

fallout: "What is truth on one side (of the Pyrenees) is

error (a lie) on the other." Ergo, what the United States

and the international community saw in Abdallahi, a symbol of

democracy in its youth and promise, was perceived entirely

differently in Mauritania. That, he believes is the crux of

the impasse between Mauritanians and the international

community currently. In a society that has lost faith in the

rule of law, security, and leadership, democracy has lost

meaning. While the international community remains attached

to this false notion of democracy, Mauritanian politicians

see themselves as elected parliamentarians as potentially

helping to find a solution -- since they are the last remnant

of democracy that has not yet eroded. One member of the

party noted that historically legitimacy exists only when

three conditions are met: 1) the law is on one's side, 2)

the performance of one's government is on your side and 3)

the national consensus is on one's side. President

Abdallahi, having lost all of the three aforementioned

criteria, had, in effect, become illegitimate.

19. (C) DAS Moss provided Daddah with the U.S. position as

noted in Para 15. He stressed that the U.S. response was a

function of law as well as policy and that no

"interpretation" of the coup as something else could turn

back the clock. He repeated that the return of President

Abdallahi was a necessary requirement for any future

arrangements that might help Mauritania move forward -- and

stressed that any arrangement that derived from the military

structure put in place was not viable.

------------------------------------

NOUAKCHOTT 00000439 005 OF 006

Meeting with Parliamentarians

------------------------------------

20. (C) The U.S. delegation met with 12 members of

Parliament, senators and deputies, 2 women among them. As

DCM had met with several earlier in the week, much of the

same sentiment was echoed in this meeting. Unfortunately,

most of the time was co-opted by one parliamentarian who

reiterated his viewpoint on the evolution of the coup, the

same story repeated time and again. That parliamentarian was

cut off by his colleagues when he became abuse and began to

rant against American "threats." Absent from the discourse

was concrete steps to move forward, and ideas for the US and

international community to work with them on resolving the

current impasse. Again, the bottom line of the

parliamentarians remained that, while they are not in favor

of coup d'etat on principle and are in favor of democracy,

they saw President Abdallahi as blocking the democratic

process that might have reined in what they saw as his

abuses. For them, the coup was the only way out to restore

democracy. They are looking towards the international

community to help them develop democracy, the Mauritanian

way. They highlighted again that international precepts of

what democracy is cannot be transposed on the Mauritanian

situation, as it is distinct, and, as such, distinctly

complex. Mauritania is weak and young and plagued by

problems that the West cannot understand. Within this

specific context, they see the military as one of the three

key elements in Mauritanian society. Their concern remains

to be Mauritania, and if the international community is in

discord, they still believe they must do what is right for

the country, money aside. Not all of the parliamentarians

shared such a hard line and potentially isolationist

approach, others thanked the U.S. for having been a

historical friend and for working together currently to find

resolution to the impasse. Several noted that they will be

the first to protest if the military steers away from its

commitment to restore democracy "soon."

-----------------------------

Meeting with Diplomats

-----------------------------

21. (C) The U.S. Delegation met separately with French

Ambassador Vandepoorter and later, over lunch, with the

French, German, Spanish, EU and UNDP representatives to brief

them on the U.S. position, provide a readout of the earlier

meeting with General Aziz, and hear their views on the

situation. The French Ambassador spelled out what he saw as

the current military tactic. From their perspective, they

believe they are establishing constitutionality. With the

return of the parliament for a special session to start

August 28, the military will secure an organic law granting

legislative blessing for the High State Council and the

constitutional amendments established by the Council. He

expected that Aziz would release Abdallahi once the

parliament has conferred "legitimacy" -- releasing Abdallahi

as a private citizen once there is a "legitimate" president,

prime minister, and legislature. The diplomatic corps agreed

that a legislative outcome under military control could not

be seen as credible.

22. (C) XXX told DAS Moss that he

personally saw President Abdallahi as fatally flawed. There

was just enough substance to corruption charges (at least

against his wife) to seriously tarnish Abdallahi's

reputation. He said any thought of Abdallahi coming to

complete his presidential mandate was "unrealistic." At

best, he saw Abdallahi as returning but temporarily as part

of a negotiated package deal that would include his

resignation. Over lunch, the remainder of the diplomatic

corps was equally ambivalent over Abdallahi's political

future although they agreed on the principle of having to

return to a constitutional "save point" from which some

political deal could be arranged. Several Ambassadors noted

that this coup had, until now, followed the normal bloodless

tradition of past successful coups. They agreed that this

NOUAKCHOTT 00000439 006 OF 006

was not running as past coups in that there was substantial

internal opposition and a firm international rejection. They

worried that, if the situation remains unresolved for some

time, there was significant risk of violence whether from a

second coup, a forceful crackdown by the junta, social

unrest, or opportunism by either Al Qaeda or transnational

criminals who would profit from a destabilized Mauritania.

XXX noted his concern that the most ardent

supporters of Aziz tended to be White Moors while

Abdallahi,'s strongest public base was Afro-Mauritanian --

running the risk of social violence along racial lines.

-----------------------------

PRESS CONFERENCE

----------------------------

23. (U) Prior to his departure, DAS Moss held a press

conference outlining the U.S. position pre Para 15. The

conference included some 20 journalists include

representatives of Al Jezeera and Al Arabiya TV -- the most

heavily watched Arab-language networks in Mauritania.

National television broadcast parts of Moss, statement in

its first French news broadcast but dropped it from later

French and Arabic editions. Al Jezeera repeatedly showed

Moss, comments ensuring that most Mauritanian elites clearly

heard the U.S. position. At least one local paper provided a

verbatim transcript of the press conference.

-----------------

COMMENT

-----------------

24. (C) DAS Moss' visit succeeded in impressing upon the

junta and all political leanings that U.S. resistance to the

coup is firm. DOD participation in the trip was particularly

effective in dissuading General Aziz from believing that the

U.S. public stance might have a back door based on security

cooperation. General Aziz did not fold and that was not

expected. Now put on notice, we believe Aziz will feel even

more boxed in than before. Our goal is to push him to look

for an exit strategy.

25. (U) DAS Moss did not have the opportunity to review this

cable prior to his departure.

Boulware